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Robert Cover's work, on which this conference reflected, indirectly but
importantly contributed to this project. Over a decade ago, I devoted a
chapter of my scholarly career to his justly celebrated Nomos and
Narrative,' showing how Cover extracted from Jewish sources an
alternative, even if overly wishful, model of Jewish law and used that
model to expand the horizons of American legal theory. Cover not only
recalled for us modern law's connection to the sacred; he also gave those
working in the field of Jewish religious thought a new and rich vocabulary
with which to describe the rabbinic legal imagination and reminded us that
law and narrative are deeply intertwined. Robert Cover's work figures as
well in the specific subject I have chosen to explore. Cover was fond of
presenting what he called rabbinic folktales of justice, focused, as befits a
scholar of Civil Procedure and Federal Courts, on questions of
jurisdiction, whether that of the Sanhedrin (Jewish High Court) asked to
exercise jurisdiction over the king or of the attempt to revive the
jurisdiction of the Sanhedrin in sixteenth-century Safed.3 What interested
* I am particularly indebted to Ari J. Mermelstein for exceptional research assistance,
extraordinarily helpful comments on earlier drafts, and meticulous editing. I am very grateful to Adam
Seligman for inviting me to join the ritual theory colloquium at Boston University, thus providing me
with the occasion to begin exploring the subject matter of this article. Thanks to Steven Fraade,
Christine Hayes, and the participants in the Nomos and Narrative conference for their comments,
1. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983).
2. See Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to Jewish Law in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1993) [hereinafter In Pursuit of
Counter-Text].
3. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179
(1985).
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him most in these tales is the gesture of commitment to law involved in
the act of asserting and accepting jurisdiction. Indeed, in Nomos and
Narrative Cover condemns the Supreme Court's failure to accept
jurisdiction in the Bob Jones University case. Like Robert Cover, I also
teach Federal Courts and Civil Procedure, although my scholarly work is
in the field of Jewish law and thought. This particular combination of
disciplines is responsible for the interpretation I offer here of formulaic
appeals to God involving the act of circle drawing. Robert Cover, through
his rich interdisciplinary writings, played a seminal role in my own work,
and for that I am deeply grateful.
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal realists delighted in showing the survival of magical forms of
thought within modem legal systems.4 In the course of their attack on the
representation of modem law as rational, they drew attention to the fact
that "rational law" and "irrational magic" resemble each other in striking
ways and make use of common devices. One is the performative, or, as
Austin called it, How To Do Things with Words.5 Austin had in mind
verbal legal formulae, which, when uttered, alter the legal status of
persons or things. The Scandinavian legal theorist Axel Hagerstrom,
investigating Roman law, viewed such performatives as a continuation of
a primitive belief in word magic, in which the utterance of a formula is
supposed to bring about changes in the real world.6 More recently,
anthropologists have debated whether Austin's category of performatives
provides a useful way to understand magical practices in primitive
societies.' In Austin's account, however, there is a constitutive
relationship between the performative and what it brings about.8 A new
legal relationship is constituted by the very act of uttering something.
Thus, if the proper procedure is used, the act itself effects a transition from
one conventionally defined state to another. The purpose of the
performative is to establish a new legal relationship. By contrast, word
magic implies a causal relationship between the act of uttering, which is
effective or ineffective, and what it brings about in the real world. When
the magician uses proper procedures and the desired result, nevertheless,
4. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Modern Legal Magic, in COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 37 (1949); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935).
5. JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962).
6. Even John Searle, a theorist of performative language, speaks of "a quasi-magical power of...
bringing about changes in the world through our utterances." See John R. Searle, How Performatives
Work, 58 TENN. L. REv. 371, 384 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Emily M. Ahem, The Problem of Efficacy: Strong and Weak Illocutionary Acts, 14
MAN 1 (1979); S.J. Tambiah, A Performative Approach to Ritual, 65 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 113 (1979).
8. See AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 6-11.
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does not ensue, failure is usually attributed to causal reasons. 9  The
distinction is important because it bears on the proper classification of the
act of reciting a formula as legal or magical.
Nonverbal ritual enactments, although they do not pose language
problems, may also be performatives and, therefore, are equally difficult
to classify."0 As with verbal recitations, some rituals are magical acts,
designed directly to actualize a new reality in the physical world by, for
example, coercing the deity into a desired act; others are legal or religious
performatives, acts that reference or activate an underlying legal or
theological concept. Ritual performatives can be found even in secular-
legal systems. For example, the service of a summons on the defendant or
attachment of property signals the presence of a person or property within
the boundaries of the court and, at the same time, activates the court's
power over that person or property. These ritual enactments express, in
concrete form, a mental phenomenon: the legal concept of jurisdiction.
And like verbal performatives, the ritual activates what it signifies.
As Austin explained, performatives operate against the background of
convention, which allows us to understand what, precisely, a statement or
act is referencing or activating." Thus, the transformations produced by
certain acts or statements are the result of the background meaning they
carry in a given society. If we no longer had access to that background
meaning already in place within a society, it would be virtually impossible
to tell, for example, whether the bare recitation of a verbal formula was
word magic, a religious ritual with recognizable meaning, or a legal
performative intended to generate both in the person uttering it and in state
actors, a feeling of being bound by a new set of rules or normative
obligations. 12
With respect to ancient cultures, especially the complex culture that was
late antique Judaism, in which law and religion were fused but in which
magic was also practiced, this difficulty in classifying ritual and verbal
acts as either magical, religious, or legal, when access to the background
meaning the act carries is obscured, is a critical issue, for it bears on the
essential character of early rabbinic Judaism. Although much attention
has been paid to the question of how to distinguish magic from religion in
late antiquity, the affinity between magical rituals or formulae and legal
performatives is one that has been largely ignored by scholars who study
ancient rabbinic texts. This essay is an attempt to fill that gap by asking
9. See D.S. Gardner, Performativity in Ritual: The Mianmin Case, 15 MAN 346, 348 (1983).
10. On rituals as performatives, see ROY A. RAPPAPORT, RITUAL AND RELIGION IN THE MAKING
OF HUMANITY 107-38 (1999).
11. See AUSTIN, supra note 5, at 14-15.
12. Martin P. Golding, Rights, Performatives, and Promises in Karl Olivecrona's Legal Theory,
18 RATIO JURIS 16, 24 (2005). Golding notes that, despite the large amount of literature devoted to this
topic, a sense of mystery remains as to how this feeling comes about.
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whether one such ritual, circle drawing, attributed to various religious
figures in rabbinic texts and often viewed as a magical practice, is better
understood as a legal performative, that is, a concrete enactment of a legal
concept.
Such a shift in perspective has the potential to subtly alter our picture of
early rabbinic culture. A key issue in the study of early rabbinic culture is
the nature of certain religious virtuosos, to whom various so-called
magical actions are attributed in talmudic-midrashic literature. Were the
ritual acts attributed to these religious figures understood, within rabbinic
culture itself, as magical acts-thus pointing to the recognition of a type of
holy man within late antique Jewish culture similar to the Hellenistic
divine man-or were these actions understood instead as legal
performatives whose meaning was embedded in a complex of religio-legal
concepts? The Judaism of late antiquity varied and Jews certainly
practiced a range of magical activities in the rabbinic period. The
question, however, is how far magical practices penetrated the heart of
normative rabbinic texts. Given that rabbinic texts (including the
midrashic literary corpus) are the products of a strong legal culture, it
should not surprise us if there is an intricate interplay between legal
concepts and the most puzzling rituals described in them.
The body of this Article consists of a close analysis of the legal
dimensions of one literary motif found in several rabbinic narratives: the
drawing of a circle in which an intercessor figure, a holy man or prophet,
stands and then petitions God for relief from judgment. The most famous
version of these narratives can be found in Mishnah Ta'anit 3:8. The.
Mishnah reports that, during a severe drought in the late Hasmonean
period (ca. 65 BCE), the people called on the holy man, Honi ha-
Me'aggel, Honi the Circle Drawer, to pray for rain. Honi, confident that
he would succeed, immediately ordered the people to bring the paschal
ovens inside to prevent their damage by the rain. He prayed, but to no
avail. Honi then drew a circle, stood within the circle, and said: "Lord of
the Universe, Your children have turned to me, for before You, I am like a
member of the family. I swear by Your Great Name that I shall not move
from this spot until you take pity on your children." It began to rain drop
by drop. Honi prayed again, saying: "This is not as I requested; [rather, I
intended] rain to fill the cisterns." Immediately, rain poured forth in
buckets. Honi prayed yet again, saying: "This is not as I requested; [rather
I intended] rain of blessing..." Finally, it rained in the proper amount,
until the people were forced to take refuge in the Temple Mount. The
people then asked Honi to pray for the rain to cease. Honi said to them:
"See if the Claimant's Stone is erased." The Mishnah reports that Shimon
ben Shetah sent Honi a message: "Were you not Honi, I would proclaim
against you a ban. But what shall I do to you? You are like a child who
misbehaves before God, yet He does your wish, like a son who
[Vol. 17:97
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misbehaves before his father, yet [his father] does his wish."
The Honi story is one of those narratives, like the Oven of Akhnai
story, 13 that has captured the imagination of generations of Jewish
scholars. One of the chief reasons that the story has drawn so much
comment is its appearance in the Mishnah, a legal code. Indeed, the story
is introduced as a legal precedent. The reporting of the strange act of
circle drawing, together with adjuration and seemingly miraculous
production of rain, within the Mishnah is surprising. The power to
perform magic or miracles is unusual in early rabbinic Judaism and the
Mishnah, in contrast to the Talmud, contains no other such stories about
magic or miracles performed by tannaitic rabbis or even their Pharisaic
predecessors. Although magic is not an explicit theme in any of the
versions of the Honi narrative, numerous scholars, nonetheless, have
equated Honi's circle with magical practices.14 According to this view,
the drawing of a magic circle is, either an act of theurgy, intended to
coerce God, akin to methods and magical symbols in other cultures used
to adduce rain, or a protective device, "by means of which the magician
establishes for himself a private, forbidden precinct in which demonic
spirits cannot trespass."' 5 This view is part and parcel of the strand of the
scholarly search for traces of magical and esoteric traditions preserved in
rabbinic midrash, particularly of early Palestinian provenance, in which I
too participated at an earlier stage in my career. I argued then that
numerous rabbinic narratives, particularly centered on the figure of Moses,
preserve esoteric traditions of magical practices more fully described in
the non-rabbinic hekhalot literature of the same general period.' 6 The
magical practices of holy men are used in order to bridge the gap between
earth and heaven. Such esoteric practices typically involve adjuration in
God's name, a magical technique enabling the practitioner to ascend
safely to heaven, to overcome dangers along the path, and to learn divine
secrets. Pursuant to this interpretation, the holy man uses such rituals both
to protect himself from danger and to gain power over God.
13. On the varying interpretations of this story in legal and other academic literature, see Stone,
In Pursuit of the Counter-Text, supra note 2, at 855-64.
14. Citing evidence from post-talmudic medieval writers, scholars such as Lajos Blau, Samuel
Daiches, Joshua Trachtenberg, William Green, and, initially, Judah Goldin viewed the drawing of a circle
accompanied by the adjuration "I shall not move from here" as evidence of magical practices within
rabbinic circles. See LAjOS BLAU, DAS ALTJUDISCHE ZAUBERWESEN 33 (1914); ADOLF BOCHLER, TYPES
OF JEWISH-PALESTINIAN PIETY 254 (1968); SAMUEL DAICHES, BABYLONIAN OIL MAGIC IN THE
TALMUD AND IN THE LATER JEWISH LITERATURE 33 (1913); JUDAH GOLDIN, THE FATHERS ACCORDING
TO RABBI NATHAN 187 n.25 (1955); JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG, JEWISH MAGIC AND SUPERSTITION 121
(1939); William Scott Green, Palestinian Holy Men: Charismatic Leadership and Rabbinic Tradition,
2.19.2 AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER ROMISCHEN WELT 619, 634-35 (1979) [hereinafter
Palestinian Holy Men].
15. GOLDIN, supra note 14.
16. See Suzanne J. Last, Moses as Magician-Mystic in the Rabbinic Haggadah (1974)
(unpublished B.A. Thesis, on file with Princeton University).
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This understanding of the magical practices of holy men situates holy
men within the typology of the divine man, theios aner, a well-known type
in Greek, Hellenistic Jewish, and Jewish sectarian literature. 17 Like the
prototypical Hellenistic divine man Apollonius, as portrayed by
Philostratus, this is a figure who bridges the gap between man and God
through miracle-working,1 8 or through ascent to Heaven, as in the Qumran
fragments.' 9 The divine man is also associated with the highest form of
magician in the Hellenistic world.
One became a magician in Hellenistic culture through ascent and the
acquisition of power and knowledge possessed by the gods through
learning the names of the divinities. The Hellenistic Jewish community
borrowed this pagan model and deified Moses as a divine man who
ascended through heaven using his magical rod and other magical
techniques, such as the drawing of a magic circle, adjuration, and use of
God's names. 20 Traces of this image can be found in rabbinic sources
about Moses that emphasize his magical uses of the rod, the circle, and the
divine name.2' Rabbinic stories about Honi ha-Me'aggel and other early
Palestinian wonder workers, such as Hanina ben Dosa, are often seen as
part of this complex.22 Both Honi and Moses drew magic circles and used
adjuration in performing miracles, such as producing rain or healing.
With respect to the Honi story in particular, some scholars have suggested
that its inclusion in rabbinic legal sources underscores the permeation of
magical ideas, as well as the penetration of the typology of the Hellenistic
divine man who performs wonders and magic, even within normative
17. For the Greco-Roman evidence, see Peter Brown, The Rise and Function of the Holy Men in
Late Antiquity, 61 J. ROMAN STUD. 80 (1971); GRAHAM ANDERSON, SAGE, SAINT, AND SOPHIST:
HOLY MEN AND THEIR ASSOCIATES IN THE EARLY ROMAN EMPIRE (1994).
18. See E.L. Bowie, Apollonius of Tyana: Tradition and Reality, 2.16.2 AUFSTIEG UND
NIEDERGANG DER ROMISCHEN WELT 1652 (1978).
19. See John J. Collins, A Throne in the Heavens: Apotheosis in Pre-Christian Judaism, in
DEATH, ECSTASY, AND OTHER WORLDLY JOURNEYS 41-58 (John J. Collins & Michael Fishbane eds.,
1995); James R. Davila, Heavenly Ascents in the Dead Sea Scrolls, in 2 THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS
AFTER FIFTY YEARS 461-85 (Peter W. Flint & James C. Vanderkam eds., 1999); Morton Smith,
Ascent to the Heavens and Deification in 4QMT, in ARCHAEOLOGY AND HISTORY IN THE DEAD SEA
SCROLLS: THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE IN MEMORY OF YIGAEL YADIN 181, 187
(Lawrence H. Schiffman ed., 1990).
20. On the traditions surrounding the ascension of Moses, see Wayne A. Meeks, Moses as God
and King, in RELIGIONS IN ANTIQUITY 354-71 (Jacob Neusner ed., 1970). Moses was widely
recognized as a magician in pagan circles as well; see JOHN G. GAGER, MOSES IN GRECO-ROMAN
PAGANISM 134-61 (1972); John G. Gager, Moses the Magician: Hero of an Ancient Counter-
Culture?, 21 HELIOS 179, 179-88 (1994).
21. See Last, supra note 16, at 83-159.
22. See Baruch Bokser, -Wonder-Working and the Rabbinic Tradition: The Case of Hanina ben
Dosa, 16 J. FOR THE STUDY OF JUDAISM 42 (1985); Sean Freyne, The Charismatic, in IDEAL FIGURES
IN ANCIENT JUDAISM 223 (George Nickelsburg & J.J. Collins eds., 1980); Jack Lightstone, Magicians,
Holy Men and Rabbis: Patterns of the Sacred in Late Antique Judaism, in 5 APPROACHES TO ANCIENT
JUDAISM 133 (William Scott Green ed., 1985); Geza Vermes, Hanina ben Dosa, 23 J. JEWISH STUD.
28 (1972); Geza Vermes, Hanina ben Dosa, 24 J. JEWISH STUD. 51 (1973).
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early rabbinic culture.23 Others have argued that the story's inclusion in
the Mishnah reflects a programmatic effort by the early rabbis to counter
the power such wonder workers had among the masses or to assimilate it
to that of the rabbis.24 The Mishnah's primary aim, they contend, is either
intended to cast doubt on the miracle worker's conduct and talents, thus
reinforcing rabbinic power, or to suggest that the power to produce rain,
formerly localized in the Temple and the priestly cult, had been taken over
by the rabbis, whom Honi represents.25 Eventually, it is argued, these
figures were increasingly 'rabbinized,' a process evident in the Babylonian
elaboration of the Honi story.26
Such analyses of the Honi story often fail to look at the larger context of
the story and the motif of circle drawing as it was further developed in
midrashic-talmudic literature. In each case of circle drawing in rabbinic
literature the drawing of the circle is a prelude to a prayer on the part of an
intercessor figure that God reverse a judgment or explain his apparent
injustice. Yet, the connection between the two within rabbinic culture-
prayer for justice and a supposed magical rite-has thus far eluded
scholars. I suggest here that the drawing of the circle is best explained in
terms of the legal imagination-or what Paul Kahn has called a crucial
aspect of "law's aesthetic:" the imaginative construction of the space from
which law issues.27  The circle is a legal performative effecting the
creation of an authoritative judicial proceeding. In short, it is an
imaginative enactment of the legal idea of what we now call jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction entails locating the parties, either actually or
metaphorically, within the boundaries of authoritative legal space,
compelling both the defendant to answer a complaint and the judge to
respond. And I shall argue, drawing on internal rabbinic and extra-
rabbinic evidence, that the circle serves to locate God within the
boundaries of the legal space it maps out. The mapping out of the space in
which God is located is intimately connected to prayer in rabbinic texts.
Thus, this interpretation places circle drawing squarely within the complex
of legal forms that characterizes the petitionary prayers of holy men, who
assume an intercessory role continuous with that of the ancient biblical
prophet/advocate before the divine court. At the same time, this
interpretation raises the larger question of whether the distinction between
magical acts and legal performatives and between the typology of the
lawyer and that of the shaman-both in the ancient and modern world-is
23. See supra note 14.
24. See JACOB NEUSNER, JUDAISM: THE EVIDENCE OF THE MISHNAH 325-27 (2d ed. 1988).
25. See Green, Palestinian Holy Men, supra note 14, at 39-41.
26. See supra note 22.
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a meaningful one. The fine line between legal performatives and magical
rituals, and between law and magic generally, is a subject that I will return
to at the end of this essay.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF CIRCLE DRAWING IN RABBINIC
CULTURE
A. The Honi Narrative
The Honi narrative is preserved and elaborated in four rabbinic legal
compilations. 8 Each version casts Honi's actions in a subtly different
light, and also reflects varying uses of the story by the redactors of the
documents in which the story appears. I shall not rehearse all the details
here, especially those fully explored by others.29  The talmudic
elaborations on the criticism of Honi's conduct, recorded in the Mishnah,
constitute an important starting point, however, for understanding the
meaning of Honi's circle and his accompanying acts. It is worth re-
quoting this part of the Mishnah in full:
Shimon ben Shetah sent a message to him: "If you were not Honi, I
should decree a ban against you. But what shall I do to you? For you
misbehave towards the Omnipresent yet he does what you wish, like
a son who misbehaves towards his father, yet he does what he wishes.
Concerning you scripture says: 'Let your father and mother be glad,
and let her that bore you rejoice.'" 30
Shimon ben Shetah was a well-known opponent of magic, who is reported
to have hanged eighty witches in a single day.3' Yet, the ground Shetah
explicitly offers in the Mishnah for his opposition to Honi rests, instead,
on the bold, importuning character of Honi's prayer.32 Honi has skirted
the line of proper etiquette toward God.
The two talmudic versions of the story are more explicit than the
Mishnah in identifying what is objectionable about Honi's conduct. As in
the Mishnah, the arrogant and demanding nature of Honi's prayer is
disturbing. This objection is related to larger legal questions about when
28. MISHNAH, Ta"anit 3:8; TOSEFTA, Ta"anit 2:13 (with important modifications; see infra note
34); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ta 'anit 23a; PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ta 'anit 66d. The story also appears
in one of the scholia of Megillat Ta 'anit in connection with a holiday observed on the 20th of Adar;
for that text and a discussion of its connection with the story as told in the Talmud, see VERED NOAM,
MEGILLAT TA'ANIT: VERSIONS, INTERPRETATION, HISTORY (Hebrew) 309-11 (2003).
29. See Green, Palestinian Holy Men, supra note 14.
30. Proverbs 23:25.
31. See MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 6:4; PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 23a.
32. See Yisrael Rosenson, The Act of Honi the Circle Drawer in Jewish Law and Thought
(Hebrew), at http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/kitveyet/taleley/maase-2.htm, who notes that Shimon b.
Shetah, a well-known opponent of magic, would not have hesitated to condemn Honi had he suspected
Honi of magical practices.
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petitionary prayer is permissible. Technically, the Honi story is invoked
in the Mishnah as a precedent (a ma 'aseh), one that must be reconciled
with the larger legal discussion, and not merely as a narrative digression.
The story functions as a case study testing various legal doctrines about
prayer under discussion. The linkage in the Mishnah is clear: the story is
recorded immediately after the Mishnah declares the legal proposition that
"one cries out for every calamity that befalls the community, with the
exception of excess rain." In praying for the rain to abate after it poured
forth in buckets, Honi's precedent contradicts the rule.33 This conflict is
minimized in the Tosefta version, highlighted in the Palestinian Talmud,
and noted by later commentators, who are at pains to point out an
ambiguity in the Mishnaic text about whether Honi actually prayed for the
rain to cease entirely.34
The story implicates other legal issues, as well. Is prayer effective and
hence permissible after a divine decree has already been issued? 35  May
one generally pray to revoke an excess of good? May one approach God
with prayer at any time, at man's initiative, or must it be at the invitation
of God, just as one may not approach a human sovereign without first
securing permission?36 In the Mishnah, Shimon ben Shetah's remarks
serve to reconcile the law and the case. Honi's brazenness is exempt from
punishment because the divine sovereign acquiesced. Such behavior is
reserved for an exceptionally righteous individual like Honi, who is a
familiar of God.37  The legal theme of proper and improper requests is
equally a focus of the Babylonian Talmud, which earlier in the tractate
discusses cases in which famous biblical figures made improper requests,
yet God nonetheless responded in a proper and generous manner.38
Both the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmud repeat and comment on
Shetah's criticism but diverge in their emphasis. The Palestinian Talmud
33. Jacob Neusner, The Aggadic Role in Halakhic Discourse: The Case of Mishnah-Tosefta-
Yerushalmi-Bavli Taanit, 5 REv. RABBINIC JUDAISM 51, 62 (2002).
34. In the Tosefta version, the pray-er is an anonymous hasid; there is no circle; he is answered
immediately; and there is no criticism of his actions. Moreover, the actions of the pray-er in the
Tosefta are entirely consistent with the Mishnah's mandate that one does not pray in response to
excess rain, a message that he delivers to the people when they ask him to pray for the rain to stop.
This message, attributed to the hasid in the Tosefta, is attributed by the Palestinian Talmud to Rabbi
Eliezer, implicitly criticizing Honi for praying for the rain to stop. The hasid is thus portrayed in a
positive light in the Tosefta, while Honi is criticized in the Palestinian Talmud.
35. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 58a.
36. See Shlomo Naeh, "Creates the Fruit of Lips": A Phenomenological Study of Prayer
According to Mishnah Berakhot 4:3, 5:5 (Hebrew), 63 TARBIZ 185, 211-13 (1994). He claims that
this is the central issue linking the aggadah of Mishnah Berakhot 5:5 and the halakhic position of
Rabbi Akiva in Mishnah Berakhot 4:3.
37. On Honi as hasid and on the relationship of the hasidim to halakhah and to special customs
regarding prayer, see Shemuel Safrai, Teaching of Pietists in Mishnaic Literature, 16 J. JEWISH STUD.
15 (1965), and Berachyahu Lifshitz, "Aggadah " and Its Role in the History of the Oral Law (Torah
She'Be'al Peh) (Hebrew), 22 SHENATON HA-MISHPAT HA-IVRI, 233, 297-308 (2001-03).
38. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ta'anit 4a.
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elaborates why Honi's initial request for rain was not answered: "for he
did not approach modestly."3 9 (Recall that, in the Mishnah, Honi is
portrayed as confident, at first, that his prayer will be answered.) Indeed,
the Palestinian Talmud deepens the criticism, repeating Shimon ben
Shetah's rebuke that one who acts like Honi deserves excommunication,
but omitting Shimon's ultimate conclusion that God's apparent pleasure in
Honi's actions exempts him from punishment.40 This mitigation is
transferred over to Rabban Gamliel. Although Shimon ben Shetah's
rebuke is recorded in the Babylonian Talmud, the Babylonian Talmud's
version softens the criticism by assigning to the people a larger part in
urging Honi to intervene on their behalf.4 In both the Babylonian and
Palestinian Talmud, the people initially urge Honi to pray for rain. In the
Palestinian Talmud, once light rain falls, the people address one another,
but they do not address Honi, and we do not hear from them again until
the end of the story. In the Babylonian Talmud, by contrast, the people
continue to press Honi even after he seems content to stop. This
reworking of the story serves to emphasize that Honi is responding to the
requests of both the people and his students and is not acting on his own
behalf or initiative.
The talmudic elaborations of the story, however, are concerned with the
propriety of Honi's entire course of conduct, including Honi's oath and the
circle, and not solely his prayer for the rain to abate. Both Talmuds
question Honi's oath-taking and conclude that it was improper. Yet,
again, the impropriety of the oath does not turn on the ground that it
constitutes adjuration, the use of magical power over God's name to
coerce the divinity. Rather, Honi, like a good lawyer, has put God to a
difficult choice-either deliver rain or prove Honi's oath false, a
desecration of God's name. Both Talmuds thus recall the case of Elijah
here (and the parallels between the Honi story and those surrounding
Elijah's prayer for rain on Mount Carmel are striking).42 Elijah earlier
swore that it would not rain unless Elijah wished it.43 Had Honi and Elijah
overlapped, God's name would be profaned by one of them.
The circle draws comment only in the Babylonian Talmud, which
proceeds to supply a legal precedent for Honi's act. The Talmud
elaborates that the practice of circle drawing derives from the prophet
39. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ta'anit 66d.
40. Id.
41. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ta"anit 23a.
42. See Gad B. Sarfatti, Pious Men, Men of Deeds, and the Early Prophets (Hebrew), 26 TARBIZ
126, 127-29 (1956-57); see also Genesis Rabbah 13:5 (Vilna edition) ("'And there was no man to
work the land': [Meaning,] there was no man who would cause humanity to work for God, like Elijah
and Honi the Circle Drawer.").
43. During the course of its discussion of Honi, the Babylonian Talmud alludes to the fact that
Elijah possessed the "keys of rain," a legal metaphor drawn from the use of keys to signal exclusive rights
of control over property. For a fuller discussion, see BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin II 3a.
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Habakkuk, about whom the verse says: "I will stand at my watchpost
(mishmarti) and station myself on the rampart (matzor)."" The
continuation of this verse is as follows: "I will keep watch to see what he
will say to me, and what he will answer concerning my complaint." 45
Midrash Tehillim offers a play on the word "matzor," taking it to imply
the drawing of a shape (tzurah).46 The verse from Habakkuk is explained
there as follows: "This teaches that Habakkuk drew a shape [tzar tzurah],
and stood within it, and said: I shall not move from here until You, God,
disclose why You reward evildoers in this life."47 This invocation of
authoritative precedent for Honi's act suggests that the drawing of the
circle may have been a particular locus of concern. Yet, in supplying an
authoritative precedent for Honi's strange act, the Babylonian Talmud
again portrays Honi in a softer light than is portrayed in the Palestinian
Talmud.
Thus, a major difficulty with the magical interpretation of the circle and
the consequent identification of Honi as a representative of a particular
type of holy man who uses magical techniques to coerce God to produce
rain is that it bears virtually no connection to the internal viewpoint and
larger legal context of the story, as presented in the Mishnah and in the
later talmudic elaborations. These sources are chiefly concerned with the
legality of Honi's petitionary prayer, given its aggressive nature. The
sources also emphasize the intricate interplay between Honi and the
people, portraying Honi as one who takes on an intercessory role on behalf
of the community to reverse a divine decree.
B. Circle Drawing and Demanding Prayer
The connection between circle drawing and aggressive prayer by
intercessor figures has been further obscured by the near-exclusive
attention paid to the Honi story in analyzing the motif of circle drawing
and the consequent failure to consider the evidence that emerges from
other midrashic treatments of this theme. Although the act of circle
drawing is associated primarily with the Honi stories, on account of his
name-Honi ha-Me'aggel, the Circle Drawer48 -the theme of drawing a
circle, accompanied with the phrase "I shall not move from here" is also
found in rabbinic midrashim about Moses and Habakkuk and should be
analyzed as a coherent motif.49 Circle drawing is ascribed not only to
44. NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION, HABAKKUK 2:1.
45. Id.
46. Midrash Tehillim, ch. 77, p. 343 (Salomon Buber ed., 1966). For a translation, see WILLIAM
G. BRAUDE, 2 THE MIDRASH ON PSALMS 18 (1976).
47. Id.
48. On me'aggel as also referring to rolling or leveling of roofs, see JEFFREY L. RUBENSTEIN,
RABBINIC STORIES 279 n.3 (2002). For other possibilities, see Rosenson, supra note 32.
49. On Moses, see below; on Habakkuk, see Midrash Tehillim, supra note 46.
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Honi and Habakkuk, but also to Moses. In Avot de-Rabbi Natan, Aaron
informs Moses that God has afflicted Miriam with a skin disease for
slandering Moses and asks that Moses intervene. ° Immediately, Moses
draws a small circle, stands within it, announces that he will not move
from here, and requests that God heal Miriam. In Deuteronomy Rabbah,
Moses addresses God's divine decree, here described as a sealed
judgment, that Moses will not enter the land of Israel. 51 The midrash
describes Moses as acting lightly toward that decree, waiting until the last
possible moment to protest. "And when Moses saw that a binding divine
decree had been sealed against him Moses immediately decreed upon
himself a fast, drew a small circle, and said: 'I shall not move from here
until the divine decree is obliterated."' 52
All these cases of circle drawing involve, in different fashion, the
questioning of God's justice: Either they are an appeal to reverse a divine
judgment or a request for an explanation of God's apparent injustice.
Moreover, all involve requests from God after God initially resists. God is
either unresponsive or has already issued a contrary divine decree.
Finally, Honi, Moses, and Habakkuk are each identified elsewhere in
rabbinic literature as individuals who petitioned God in an arrogant and
demanding fashion. Indeed, Judah Goldin identifies the prayers of Honi,
Moses, and Habakkuk, with their accompanying rituals of oath-taking,
circle drawing, and formulaic utterance "I shall not move from here," as a
discrete genre of "demanding prayers" by holy men who intercede on
behalf of the people before God.53  These holy men-who proffer
demanding prayers-emerge as a type of religious virtuoso. They are not
religious virtuosos on the model of the Hellenistic divine man but are
rather the familiar religious virtuosos of the intercessor, taken from the
biblical model of the prophet, who does legal battle with God through
petitionary prayers. Such prayers for justice are documented across late
antique culture and emerge as a particularly distinctive aspect of ancient
rabbinic Judaism.
The prophetic intercessor is the closest analogue in rabbinic legal
50. AVOT DE-RABBI NATAN (Solomon Schechter ed., 1967), ch. 9, s.v. Rabbi Shimon.
51. Deuteronomy Rabbah (Jerusalem: Y.D. Halevi, 1985), Parashah 11.
52. Id.
53. Such demanding prayers are only acceptable, Goldin argues, when the speaker "is not making
some request for himself but is demanding in behalf of someone else who is in straits." Judah Goldin, On
Honi the Circle Maker: A Demanding Prayer, in STUDIES IN MIDRASH AND RELATED LITERATURE 331,
334 (Barry L. Eichler & Jeffrey H. Tigay eds., 1988) [hereinafter On Hom]. Accordingly, Goldin
dismisses the text of Deuteronomy Rabbah, where Moses draws a circle and prays for himself, as
corrupted, noting that in the Midrash Petirat Moshe, Moses opts to fast and pray but does not draw a circle.
See also Zahava Neuberger, Midrash Deuteronomy Rabbah: Its Nature and Place in the Framework of the
Tanhuma-Yelamdenu Literature (Hebrew) 15 n.8 (1999) (Ph.D. dissertation, on file with Hebrew
University) (considering parashah 10 to be a later interpolation into the text of Deuteronomy Rabbah by
way of Midrash Petirat Moshe). Note, however, that demanding prayer need not be confined to cases of
intercession; it is also applicable to cases of exigency and great distress.
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culture to the ideal lawyer/advocate. Prophetic intercession takes the form
not simply of demanding prayer but of argument and the lodging of a legal
complaint or appeal from a decree. This legal form is typical of Israelite
prophecy and prayer, and also differs from prophecy and prayer to God in
ancient Mesopotamian religion. In the latter, "intercession was almost
always by gods ... whose anger was soothed with prayer and music, but
not with argument," and complaints and charges were not brought before
the deity himself.54 In contrast, the biblical prophets invoke legal
arguments and appeals to persuade God to cancel his decrees. The
prophet's function is to "stand in the breach against God," as Ezekiel
22:30-31 phrases it, and do legal battle with Him.55 This conception of
intercession and prayer is based on the assumption of a stable order of
justice sustained by God.
The emotional and psychological dimensions of prophetic prayer as
legal advocacy is the subject of Yochanan Muff's magisterial essay on the
Israelite prophets. From a form-critical perspective, Joseph Heinemann
claims that petitionary prayer bears a striking resemblance to legal
forms,56 which philological studies of the Hebrew verb for prayer (pl)
underscore.57 The root of the verb "to pray," the rabbinic appellation of
the one who prays, as well as the structure of petitionary prayer, all allude
to legal argument or advocacy. The rabbis refer to the one who prays as a
sanegor, a Greek loan-word that means advocate and is consistently
contrasted with a kategor (prosecutor).58 The sanegor who leads the
community in prayer tries to forestall or overcome God's decision, which
is appropriately described as a din, or legal decree.59 God is often depicted
as both the prosecutor and judge-the dual role he occupies in the circle
54. YOCHANAN MUFFS, LOVE AND Joy: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND RELIGION IN ANCIENT ISRAEL xix
(1992) [hereinafter LOVE AND JOY].
55. Yochanan Muffs, Who Will Stand in the Breach? A Study of Prophetic Intercession, in LOVE AND
JOY 9 (1992).
56. JOSEPH HEINEMANN, PRAYER IN THE TALMUD: FORMS AND PATTERNS 193-217 (1977).
57. When conjugated in the pi'el form, the root of the Hebrew word indicating the action of
prayer, pll, variously means "to pronounce judgment," "to be the arbitrator, intercessor," "to speak up
for," and "to assume," see LUDWIG KOEHLER & WALTER BAUMGARTNER, 2 THE HEBREW AND
ARAMAIC LEXICON OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 933 (M.E.J. Richardson trans., 2001), or, alternatively,
"to attribute responsibility to someone, hold someone accountable," see Adele Berlin, On the Meaning
ofpll in the Bible, 96 REVUE BIBLIQUE 345, 348 (1989). Almost all of the attested instances of the
root in the hitpa 'el form mean either "to make an intercession for," or relatedly, "to pray."
58. For a sampling of sources, see DANIEL SPERBER, A DICTIONARY OF GREEK & LATIN TERMS
IN RABBINIC LITERATURE 126-30 (1984).
59. See, e.g., PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Rosh Hashanah 1:3 (57b) (translated in EDWARD A. GOLDMAN,
THE TALMUD OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL: ROSH HASHANAH 44 (1988)):
Rabbi Hama the son of Rabbi Hanina and Rabbi Hoshaya: one said.... And the other said: is
there a nation like this nation? Customarily, the ruler says the trial (ha-din) is today, and the
robber says tomorrow is the trial. To whom do they listen? Is it not to the ruler? But the Holy
One Blessed be He is not thus. The Bet Din said: today is Rosh Hashanah. The Holy One
Blessed be He says to the ministering angels: set up the platform, let the defenders (sanegorin)
rise and let the prosecutors (kategorin) rise; for my children have said, today is Rosh Hashanah.
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narratives. He is both defendant/appellee and judge.
Heinemann also identifies a rabbinic tradition of "forceful" prayer,
which made use of the pattern of courtroom pleas, contrasting this pattern
to that commonly found in the ancient Near East, of supplication by the
"servant before His master," in which God is praised and thanked and the
request for relief is phrased as request for undeserved mercy or
generosity.6" In the law court pattern, the petitioner opens by briefly
addressing God in honorific terms (typically Master of the Universe),
delineating the relevant facts, and concluding with an argument on the
basis of which God must grant relief.6 The argument sometimes invokes
precedent, referring to previous examples in which God granted similar
requests, while at other times it draws attention to the merits of the
petitioner himself.62 The most forcefully argued form of this genre are
those prayers recited in times of distress, in which the petitioner advocates
on behalf of his community. In this class of prayer, with "its strong words
of pleading and defense ' 63 there is an element of importunity, even
impertinence toward God that, Heinemann notes, engendered significant
rabbinic criticism but was exceedingly difficult to uproot.64 Other rabbis
defended the practice when used by exceedingly pious men interceding on
behalf of the community in times of public distress as a mode of last
resort, when previous requests were denied.65 The petitioner who uses this
form plays a double role-both accuser and defendant. God therefore also
occupies a double role-as defendant and judge.
Honi's prayer in particular and the other instances of circle drawing in
general are prime examples of the genre of aggressive prayer in the law
court pattern.66 In both the cases of Honi (per the Babylonian Talmud)
and Moses, when challenging the decrees rendered against themselves,
objections to the forcefulness of this type of prayer are initially mounted.
The Babylonian Talmud comments on the brazenness of Honi's act, which
is later mitigated on account of his success; Deuteronomy Rabbah takes
care to draw attention to Moses's modesty, perhaps in an effort to place
his aggressive prayer in a broader perspective. Significantly, in all the
circle drawing stories, the circle is drawn only after a decree has been
60. Supra note 56, at 202-203.
61. Id. at 194.
62. Id. at 194-97.
63. Id. at 200.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 200-201.
66. But see Green, Palestinian Holy Men, supra note 14, at 630 n.52 (questioning the inclusion of
Honi within this genre because the best manuscript evidence has Honi addressing God as ribbono, "its
Master" rather than as the expected ribbono shel olam, "Master of the Universe"). This slight stylistic
difference aside, however, the affinity between Honi's prayer and other similar aggressive prayers in
rabbinic literature is impressive.
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rendered: God has punished the people in the form of a drought,67 Miriam
has been afflicted with a skin disease, and a decree has been rendered
against Moses that he will not enter the land. This commonality resonates
with the legal debate in the Talmud over the question whether tza 'akah-
the traditional form of prayer-is effective after a decree has already
issued.68 In such cases, the petitioner brings his appeal in the form of a
lawsuit requesting a reversal. The requests all center on God's justice and
are lodged after God initially resists or is silent.
Heinemann notes that some of these prayers are not devoid of magical
elements, citing not only the circles made by Honi and Moses, but also
Levi's act of grasping the Torah scroll when he utters prayers on the
roof.6 9 For Heinemann there is no intrinsic connection between these
quasi-magical devices and the law court pattern of prayer. On the
contrary, he contends, magical devices that compel God to perform man's
will and prayer, qua legal petition, are essentially contradictory.7" The
common element, he speculates, is desperation. Yet, do these so-called
magical acts have a background meaning within rabbinic culture
consistent with a judicial prayer for relief from judgment?
C. Circle Drawing as a Legal Perfomative
The simplest and most straightforward explanation of this strange act of
circle drawing- consonant with the phrase "I shall not move from here"
and oath-taking which accompanies the act-is that they are dramatic
gestures of commitment on the part of the petitioner seeking to elicit a
response from God.71 The supplicant not only takes an oath, a gesture of
commitment, but also binds himself within a circle and refuses to move.
Like Austin's commissive category of performatives, they are evidence of
a moral commitment to a course of conduct in the future that generates in
the person performing it and his audience a feeling of being bound-here,
to stand before God until He responds. The phrase "I shall not move from
here," standing alone, is common in midrashic literature and, in these
cases, simply denotes seriousness of purpose. Moreover, within the four
stories of circle drawing, only Honi accompanies the circle and statement
with adjuration. Oath-taking also is evidence of commitment, and appears
elsewhere in the midrash with the accompanying phrase "I shall not move
67. For evidence that the drought was seen as divine punishment, see especially Mishnah Ta 'anit
chapter two, which discusses the prayers and exhortations recited during times of famine.
68. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gittin 58a.
69. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ta "anit 66d, cited in HEINEMANN, supra note 56, at 206 n. 11.
70. HEINEMANN, supra note 56, at 206 n.l 1.
71. See Goldin, On Honi, supra note 53, at 334. Along similar lines, Yisrael Rosenson has
suggested that the practice of circle drawing was part of an ancient practice tied to concentration in
prayer; see Rosenson, supra note 32.
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from here," signifying a commitment to elicit a response.72 Usually, such
oaths invoke heaven and earth. In Honi's case alone, the oath invokes
God's name. Use of God's name, however, does not imply that the
magical practice of adjuration is at work here. The difference between an
oath invoking heaven and earth and one invoking God's name is
durability. 73 An oath in God's name is inviolable. The drawing of a circle
may be viewed in the same vein. The circle entraps the petitioner, binding
him to his spot until God responds.
This simple explanation has much to commend it. Yet, the question
remains who is actually bound within the circle-the petitioner, God, or
both. In other words, is there a form of displacement at work, in which the
drawing of the circle entraps not only the petitioner but also God? I
approach this question by noting, first, that displacement is certainly at
work with respect to the oath. The party who is bound by the oath is not
the oath-taker but, rather, the addressee of the oath-God. An oath
generally binds, not the oath-taker, but, rather, the other party who must
abide by the oath because causing "the swearer to perjure himself ... is
not compatible with piety."74 This was precisely the gist of the Talmud's
criticism of Honi's oath-by virtue of the oath, he bound God and placed
Him in an untenable situation. Significantly, an oath taken in God's name,
as was Honi's oath, appears in seven other contexts in rabbinic literature. 7
In all seven instances, the reference is to an oath taken by God Himself
that has the effect of imposing an irreversible and binding obligation on
72. See, e.g., Genesis Rabbah Parashah two (translated in JACOB NEUSNER, GENESIS RABBAH 25
(1985)):
Simeon b. Zoma for some time had been standing, perplexed. R. Joshua came by and asked
how he was, once, then again, but he did not answer him. On the third try, he answered him in a
confused way. He said to him, "What's going on, Ben Zoma? Where are you coming from and
where are you walking?" He said to him, "From nowhere, my lord." He said to him, "Lo, I call
to testify against me heaven and earth, that I shall not moved from this spot until you tell me
where you have come from!"
73. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot 32a (I. Epstein trans. & ed., Soncino Press 1961):
Remember Abraham, Isaac and Israel Thy servants, to whom Thou didst swear by Thyself.
What is the force of "by Thyself'? R. Eleazar said: Moses said before the Holy One, blessed be
He: Sovereign of the Universe, hadst Thou sworn to them by the heaven and the earth, I would
have said, Just as the heaven and earth can pass away, so can Thy oath pass away. Now,
however, Thou has sworn to them by Thy great name: just as Thy great name endures for ever
and ever, so Thy oath is established for ever and ever.
74. SAUL LIEBERMAN, GREEK 1N JEWISH PALESTINE 108 n.85 (2d ed. 1965), cited in Green,
Palestinian Holy Men, supra note 14, at 633.
75. God takes an oath to the forefathers not to destroy the Israelites, see BABYLONIAN TALMUD,
Berakhot 32a; God takes an oath not to allow Moshe to enter the land, see Devarim Rabbah Parashah
11 (Jerusalem: Hanahal, 1983); God takes an oath that the angels Michael and Gabriel, who claim that,
after Israel, the Temple is most precious to them, will themselves torch the temple, see Midrash Zuta:
Ekhah Parashah I (Salomon Buber ed., 1963); God takes an oath that he will give the Torah to the
Israelites, see Seder Eliyahu Rabbah Parashah 22 (M. Friedman ed., 1969); God takes an oath that the
progeny of Amram will carry the Torah and the Ark; God swears that the tears that the Israelites cry as
Moses ascends the mountain a second time will one day be turned into tears ofjoy, see Seder Eliyahu
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God-a form of divine reflexivity.76
Is the circle also intended to bind God, rather than Honi? (Recall as well
that Elijah, in Kings, prior to producing rain encircles not himself but,
rather, the altar on Mount Carmel, which Elijah claims is a proper site of
God's location.)77 Judah Goldin, in his seminal article on Honi, cites a
story reported by Polybius as evidence that just such an act of
displacement is at work as well in the case of Honi's circle.78 According
to Polybius's account, when the Seleucid King Antiochus IV Epiphanes
undertook an expedition against Egypt in 168 BCE, the Romans
dispatched the general Popilius Laenas to compel Antiochus to abandon
his campaign. The King refused to render a decision on the letter; instead,
he said he wished to consult with his advisors. Then, Polybius reports:
Popilius acted in a manner which was thought to be offensive and
exceedingly arrogant. He was carrying a stick cut from a vine and
with this he drew a circle around Antiochus and told him he must
remain inside this circle until he gave his decision about the contents
of the letter. The king was astonished at this authoritative proceeding
but, after a few moment's hesitation, said that he would do all that the
Romans demanded.79
Goldin is silent on the question whether this story, which he notes "made a
profound impression on its audience and was frequently retold,"8 served
as the actual impetus for the midrashic motif. Rather, he offers this
"dramatic, perhaps sensational example of peremptoriness" 81 toward an
authority figure primarily as a means of underscoring the equally
demanding nature of Honi's actions. Honi's act of circle drawing was a
displacement, a substitute for encircling the divine sovereign. Honi,
Goldin writes, could not draw a circle around his incorporeal God:
"Instead, he draws the circle round himself and then makes his demand.
8 2
Popilius's circle, to be sure, is the most telling extra-rabbinic source for
understanding the midrashic-talmudic motif. I would like to focus more
closely both on the notion that God is, indeed, located within the circle
and on the notion, made explicit in the Popilius account, that encircling the
sovereign constitutes an authoritative legal proceeding. The encirclement
of Antiochus is specifically described as an "authoritative proceeding"
76. See KIMBERLEY C. PATTON, THE RELIGION OF THE GODS: RITUAL, PARADOX, AND DIVINE
REFLEXIVITY (2000).
77. 1 Kings 18:32.
78. See Goldin, supra note 53, at 333.
79. POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES, Book XXIX 27.4-7 (Loeb edition, W.R. Paton trans., p. 91).
80. Other sources from late antiquity citing this story can be found in EMIL SCHORER, THE
HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE IN THE AGE OF JESUS CHRIST 151-52 (rev. ed. 1973).
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against the sovereign.83 Entrapment within the circle obligates the King to
render an immediate decision. The parallels between Popilius's circle and
that of Honi are striking. Both Antiochus and God occupy the role of
defendant and judge. Both Antiochus and God initially decline to render a
decision. Antiochus explicitly states that he wishes first to communicate
with his friends about the content of the letter. God first ignores Honi's
prayer. An intercessor figure, Popilius on behalf of the Senate, Honi on
behalf of his community, then draws a circle, which is believed to be an
arrogant action. Yet, in both stories, the circle provides an authoritative
method compelling an authority figure greater in rank to respond to a
petition.
I do not argue that encircling the sovereign was a recognized legal
procedure either in Jewish or Roman law. Whether rabbinic sources even
were aware of Polybius's story is impossible to determine. Nor do we
need to posit a case of actual historical borrowing to show that the circle is
a legal performative, whose background meaning within rabbinic culture
is consistent with a judicial prayer for relief from judgment. In the legal
imagination, an authoritative legal proceeding begins with an act that both
articulates the space from which law issues and constitutes it.84 The legal
concept of jurisdiction, as Paul Kahn astutely points out, is the imaginative
articulation of this space, signifying that a court has been constituted with
the power to compel the defendant to respond and the obligation, as Cover
reminded us, to render a decision.85
A circle traditionally represents that space in ancient Greco-Roman
culture. Johan Huizinga links the ancient Greek depiction of a court as a
circle in the shield of Achilles to the concept of play intrinsic in all
cultural activities, including law.86 He has in mind the connection
between jurisdiction, lawsuits, "agonistic" contests, and "ordinary,"
antithetical play., 8 7 Justice is pronounced in a "court" that is, at bottom, a
"magic circle or playground." As Huizinga writes:88
83. POLYBIUS, supra note 79.
84. As Paul Kahn writes: "The rule of law is always rule over a defined territory. Morality may be
without borders, but law's rule begins only with the imagination ofjurisdiction." KAHN, supra note 27, at
55. The Jewish-Christian argument is, Kahn notes, a contest over law's space and borders, as much as over
law's time. The question is not only whether law's time is over but whether law's space, its jurisdiction, is
limited to Jews or is universal. The Christian argument has its parallels within Jewish legal thought as well.
Do the Noahide laws, for example, apply universally or only to non-Jews living within the physical territory
of Israel? For a discussion of this question, see DAvID NOVAK, THE IMAGE OF THE NON-JEW IN JUDAISM
11-19 (1983).
85. KAHN, supra note 27, at 55-57.
86. THE ILIAD xviii, 504 (Denison Bingham Hull trans., 1982). Included on Achilles' shield is a
scene of two disputing parties who appear before the elders, who "sat on seats of polished stone in a
sacred circle." Id. at 267, cited in JOHAN HUIZINGA, Play and Law, in HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF
THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE 76, 77 (1950).
87. HUIZINGA, supra note 86, at 76.
88. Id. at 77.
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The court is still, in the full sense of the word, the hieros kuklos, the
sacred circle within which the judges are shown sitting, in the shield
of Achilles. Every place from which justice is pronounced is a
veritable temenos, a sacred spot cut off and hedged in from the
"ordinary" world.... But whether square or round it is still a magic
circle, a play-ground where the customary differences of rank are
temporarily abolished. Whoever steps inside it is sacrosanct for the
time being.
Huizinga is concerned with the common imaginative processes cultures
exhibit in constructing legal or authoritative space. Law separates itself
from the rest of society by retreating into a designated area that is sealed
off from ordinary profane life and from social hierarchies. This enclave
not only allows parties to meet as equals; it also allows them to meet in
safety, covering over violence and aggression under the guise of authority.
In this imaginative sacred space, the court is a circle, a protected enclave
bounded off from the rest of the world, and so we find courts convening in
a circular shape in Greek, Jewish,89 and numerous other traditions. Legal
space thus resembles sacred space in its imaginative representation.
Indeed, in Greek culture, the city is also sacred and, like the court,
represents civic order. The perfect city is a circular, walled city,
surrounded by a fortress.9"
Many of the features of our story underscore Huizinga's observations
about the common imaginative processes even radically disparate cultures
exhibit in constructing authoritative, legal space. Thus, in all the stories in
which a circle is used, it forces the sovereign, who is both defendant and
jiidge, to render a decision. The drawer of the circle is criticized as acting
arrogantly against one of higher rank. Yet, he is acting authoritatively and
is thus exempt from the consequences. These universal elements that
Huizinga identifies may be intrinsic to the ritual imagination. Legal
procedures and performatives, such as is circle drawing, are, like other
ritual enactments, formal, recurrent modes of relating to another, similar to
acts of etiquette-whether that other is a human agent or a deity. A
common purpose of rituals is to help navigate boundaries, including the
boundary between man and God, just as acts of etiquette help navigate the
boundaries between people, especially those of different rank. The act of
standing within the circle can be seen, from this perspective, both as a
ritual act of role assumption, signifying the assumption of a public role-
that of the intercessor/prophet who "stands in the breach" and navigates
between God and man-as well as an act of proper procedure
accompanying prayer. Indeed, a major concern of the Honi narrative is
precisely the question of whether Honi employed proper etiquette, or
89. According to Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:3, the Sanhedrin sat in a half circle.
90. Thanks to Stephen Scully for bringing this to my attention.
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procedure, in addressing God the sovereign.
Such rituals also tend to have a blurring effect of easing, erasing, or
reversing the usual boundaries or social hierarchies. Rituals often imagine
a reversal of the ordinary state of affairs. They enact a wished-for state,
the opposite of ordinary reality, such as reversing God's apparent injustice
or obliterating his decrees. This aspect of rituals recalls its connection to
play, as play is the area where one can safely do what cannot otherwise be
done. And Honi is not only a child at play but one who safely does, like
Popilius, what is otherwise dangerous and brazen. In these narratives we
also have a reversal of the familiar image of divine judgment, in which
God judges man from His transcendent Court on High, populated by the
famalia shel ma'alah-the angels who act as prosecutors and witnesses.
Instead, these rituals imagine an earthly court in which man appeals and
God is both the defendant and the judge who will reverse his decrees.
The significance of Honi's circle, however, transcends the universal
structures Huizinga identifies and should be viewed as part of a larger
trend in rabbinic literature to locate God in advance of prayer. The rule of
law does indeed assume rule within a defined space but, as Kahn notes,
"how precisely law's space is configured is culturally contingent."91 In
this connection, the affinities of rabbinic prayer with the genre of legal
complaint yield a serious defect: How is God, in his capacity as both
defendant and judge, to be reached? Rabbinic sources, to be quoted
shortly, give expression to this problem and Honi's circle, drawn
immediately after God ignores his initial entreaty, may be a way of
locating God in space and receiving a hearing.
The different ways law's space is configured are briefly treated by Kahn
and are relevant to understanding the rabbinic conception. Kahn describes
the change in how law's space was configured from pre-modern Christian
thought to modem Western thought as "the map replacing the king's
body."92 Christian and early Western political space conceived of the state
in terms of the king's body. Just as Christ's body is the corpus of the
church, the king's body is the corpus of the state. Modem political
thought transforms the kingly corpus into the physical geography of the
map. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the mappable border demarcates
the authority or jurisdiction of the court. The person on whom the court
acts, over whom it exercises authority, must be located within the
mappable border. Originally, location had a concrete and tangible
meaning. The court could act upon a body or thing within its borders.
Persons or things outside its borders were beyond its sovereignty. Thus,
the ritual act of physically tagging the person or property within the
91. KAHN, supra note 27, at 55.
92. Id. at 60.
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territory of the court was a performative that created jurisdiction. The act
of locating the party within the borders of the state is still required today,
although location is now rationalized as a metaphysical or metaphoric
concept.
How law's space is represented in modem Western thought is also
relevant to understanding the rabbinic conception. 93 Does the circle also
connote the location of God, in either an objective, tangible sense, just as
the territorial conception of jurisdiction rests on the actual presence of the
defendant within the authoritative borders of the court, or in a
metaphysical or metaphorical sense, as modern conceptions of jurisdiction
pursue? Must God be located and, if so, where is he located? The subject
of God's location, whether everywhere at once, in heaven, in the Temple,
in the alternative altar on Mount Carmel encircled by Elijah prior to
producing rain, with the people in exile, in the Torah scroll (such as that
grasped by Levi, in Heinemann's example of a "contradictory" magical
act that accompanied a judicial form of prayer94), or wherever the holy
man stands-is a large topic. I will touch on only one potentially relevant
theme suggested by the narratives under investigation.
After the destruction of the Temple, the place where God classically
resided, alternative locations for God's presence emerged within rabbinic
culture. In his recent contribution to the extensive literature on Honi,
Menahem Hirschman suggests that the story reflects this shift.95 The
circle represents a sacred space-for Hirschman, God's house, into which
Honi, God's "son of the house," enters.96 The contrast in the story is
between the Temple Mount, where God's presence formerly resided but
which in the story serves as a profane physical structure, merely a refuge
from the deluge, and the holy man's circle, in which God now resides.
The story thus attests, according to Hirschman, to a shift of the location of
God away from the Temple to the mobile holy man or, as Jonathan Z.
Smith describes it, the "mobile magician with his equally mobile
divinity."97 God is now located wherever the holy man stands.
This shift in the location of God after the destruction of the Temple and
the "exile of the divine presence" from there, however, is not restricted to
the location of holy men, nor does this shift reflect the peculiar powers of
the "mobile magician." As Uri Ehrlich has recently shown, several of the
93. Interestingly, the modem idea of artificial, mappable borders in which law's space is contained has
roots in the thought of several seventeenth-century political theorists who self-consciously borrowed from
Hebraic and Talmudic sources. For details, see Fania Oz Salzberger, The Jewish Roots of Western
Freedom, 13 AzURE 88 (2002).
94. See HEINEMANN, supra note 56, at 206 n.l 1.
95. See Menahem Hirschman, Changing Foci of Holiness: Honi and his Grandsons (Hebrew), I
TURA 109 (1989).
96. See id. at 11I.
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laws surrounding prayer, including the standing posture and physical
orientation of one who prays, also attest to the shift of the location of God,
away from the Temple and to the precise location of anyone who recites
the amidah prayer.98 That location is given, in several rabbinic sources, a
fixed dimension: four cubits. As with theories of jurisdictional presence,
the question is whether "the divine presence" is metaphorical, subjectively
experienced in the worshipper's mind and heart, or whether it is an
"objective, tangible one."99 Ehrlich cites one source that unequivocally
takes the latter view and, in doing so, maps out precisely the space in
which God is located: 100 "I am the woman that stood by thee here (1
Samuel 1:26): R. Joshua b. Levi said: From this we learn that it is
forbidden to sit within four cubits of prayer." The four-cubit zone relates
"to the divine presence within the locus of prayer"101 and was so
understood by Hai Gaon. According to Hai Gaon, even a person who is
not himself praying, and therefore not subjectively experiencing the
presence of God, but who is within the four cubit zone of someone else
who is praying, is required to stand. 10 2 This requirement implies the actual
presence of God within this zone.
Still, the question remains: Why must God be located? The king's
body, like that of Christ, was an all-encompassing body, representing itself
as a space without an identifiable location. Yet rabbinic culture, although
maintaining that God is sovereign everywhere, nonetheless, assigns
importance to mapping God's specific location in space. Thus, when God
resided in the Temple, prophecy was possible. In our context, locating
God may serve dual purposes. Entrapping the sovereign within a circle,
either physically or metaphorically, is an act of initiating judicial'
jurisdiction, obligating a response. More importantly, there seems to be a
connection between the efficacy of prayer and locating God.
The idea of locating God in space in order for prayer to be effective
emerges most poignantly in the talmudic aggadah about Manasseh's
prayer reaching God.10 3 The midrash implies that the actual reversal of a
divine decree may hinge on the appellant's ability to reach God's location
of judgment on high. In the Babylonian Talmud's version, God must
98. See Uri Ehrlich, "When You Pray Know Before Whom You Are Standing" (bBer. 28b), 49 J.
JEWISH STUD. 38 (1998).
99. Id. at 48.
100. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot 31b, cited in Ehrlich, supra note 98, at 48.
101. Ehrlich, supra note 98, at 49.
102. Otzar ha-Geonim, Tractate Berakhot § 190 (B.M. Lewin ed., 1928), cited in Ehrlich, supra
note 98, at 49. This measure is routinely used to denominate the space an individual occupies. God is
described as located within four cubits of the halakhah (Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 8a); an
individual is not permitted to sit within four cubits of a sage (Babylonian Talmud, Kiddushin 33b); a
bill of divorce reaches the wife if it is thrown within four cubits of her location (Babylonian Talmud,
Gittin 78a).
103. Thanks to Moshe Halbertal for bringing this source to my attention.
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circumvent the attribute of strict justice in accepting Manasseh's
repentance and thus reverse the divine decree for his sins. 10 4 Thus, God
creates a physical channel for Manasseh, a tunnel that pierces the horizon,
the raki'a, in order to accept him back. In contrast, the Palestinian
Talmud's version tells an elaborate story in which the angels try to thwart
Manasseh's attempt to gain access to.God and God is compelled to burrow
a tunnel for Manasseh under God's throne.0 5 Significantly, this motif is
also present in Deuteronomy Rabbah 's depiction of Moses's prayer on his
own behalf.0 6 Note the legal imagery. A divine decree has issued stating
that Moses may not enter the land. That decree is already sealed,
however, as final-in contrast to the divine decrees of drought and skin
disease at issue for Honi and Moses when he prays on behalf of Miriam.
Moses, nonetheless, wishes to reverse the decree against him and draws a
circle. Now, as in the story of Popilius, God must respond and render an
immediate decision. God recognizes, as it were, the efficacy of Moses's
action, compelling a response. The decision, however, is not favorable to
Moses. God reasserts that this decree is res judicata. Moses did not
initially appeal the judgment and the judgment had already been sealed.
Yet, in order to prevent Moses's prayers from being effective, God orders
the ministering angels to lock all the gates of heaven in the face of the
sound of Moses's prayer, which is likened to a sword slicing through the
horizon.0 7 These midrashim imply that the efficacy of prayer hinges on
reaching God's location in heaven rather than locating him within the
space on earth occupied by the holy man. Thus, at least in Deuteronomy
Rabbah, as the text is now constituted, the circle on the ground seems to
be a pale and weak reflection of the horizon that lacks the efficacy of
tunneling to the throne or slicing through the horizon. God may be
located, in part, where the holy man stands but this does not guarantee the
appellant success; it merely compels a response from the sovereign. This
point about success, of guaranteed results or efficacy, is a crucial one and
bears on the larger question of the fine line between law and magic, a
question to which I now turn.
III. LAW, RELIGION, AND MAGIC
Until now, I have juxtaposed two different typologies-that of the
magician or divine man who forces God's hand and that of the prophetic
intercessor who does legal battle. The shaman and the intercessor,
however, are both ancient prophetic models and, as Yochanan Muffs has
104. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 103a.
105. See PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 28c.
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pointed out, the two models are not always so easily demarcated. In the
biblical texts, for example, God's hands are seen as tied until a human
being makes a request.
Theoretically, this limit to God's total autonomy is self-imposed. But
it is difficult to refute those who argue that at an earlier time there
actually was such a limitation, that at this earlier time the prophet was
a magician, an ancient shaman, or historically speaking, a reflex of
the ancient Arabian kahin, whose djin was subject to him, and not the
opposite.' 08
We see traces of this notion in the idea that God would be bound to accede
to a petition if it reached his throne-although the midrashic-talmudic
sources also emphasize God's ultimate control over whether the prayer
will reach him. The biblical depictions of the prophets also reflect this
tension. Moses has magical power and sometimes becomes a kahin
(diviner); Elijah the kahin becomes a messenger and chastiser. For Muffs,
it is in the creative tension between the shamanistic elements and the
messenger elements that the greatness of Israelite biblical prophets resides.
The shamanistic elements might be retained but within the overall context
of "outrageous advocates" on behalf of the community.
This fusing of magical and legal elements in the prophetic role returns
us full circle to the methodological issue I began with. In arguing that
ritual forms described in midrashic-talmudic sources that resemble
magical practices, such as the act of drawing a circle, are better understood
along the lines of legal performatives including the imaginative
constitution of legal space, I have drawn a clear division between the two
endeavors. Yet, that division is not always clear because much of law
itself has an aspect that may be termed magical. For example, according
to those who subscribe to the magical explanation of the circle, the circle
is a protective device from demons or, perhaps, even the wrath of God. 10 9
But, even as a legal construct, the circle, like a court, protects the appellant
from his divine antagonist. The "magic" circle of procedure and authority
dispels danger and potential violence.
The precise relationship between ritual, law, and magic is complex and
deserving of more scholarly attention. The topic has obvious parallels,
however, to the more commonly pursued topic of the relationship between
magic and religion. In the latter context, primarily three different
relationships between magic and religious ritual have been proffered. The
first essentially discounts any difference between the two. The use of the
term magic to describe religious rituals is simply a means of boundary
setting. The ascription of magic to the rituals of other groups is a way to
108. Muffs, supra note 55, at 11.
109. See supra note 14.
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mark off the boundaries between different groups, as if to say, "Your
rituals are magic, mine are religion." 110 The relationship between magic
and religious ritual also has been defined in terms of its esoteric versus
exoteric dimension. Magic connotes illegal, esoteric rituals conducted in
secret in contradistinction to legal, exoteric rituals.I" The secret nature of
magical ritual puts the practitioner in a private space and in isolation from
his fellows while exoteric rituals serve to bind community members
together and erect a boundary between fellows and others. The third harks
back to the difference between word magic and legal performatives,
outlined at the beginning of this essay, and I would like to concentrate on
this school of thought.
Within this school, rituals are classified as magical if the instrumental,
manipulative, coercive, and mechanical aspects of ritual dominate. When
rituals are primarily a form or technique of coercing or manipulating God
in order to bring about a certain change in reality, we call them magic.
The relationship between the ritual and the result is thus causal and not, as
in the case of legal performatives, constitutive. This definition has its
roots in Frazer's distinction between religious prayer, which relies on
God's power, and magic, which forces the divinity." 2 Others have rightly
cautioned that there is a danger in adhering too strictly to preconceived
classifications between coercive and manipulative rituals and supplication,
especially when dealing with cases of demanding and even aggressive
prayers recited before God in exigent circumstances. The Honi story is
cited as a prime example of the difficulty in labeling the report on one side
or another of Frazer's divide. Thus, Michael Fishbane points to the use of
a "magic circle" and the use of the divine name, "a powerful instrument,"
but importantly notes that their use here is "not intrinsically capable of
bringing about certain results"; that is, a certain change in reality." 3
The problem of classifying aggressive prayers crosses cultural
boundaries and is not confined to rabbinic texts. Versnel, in discussing
various Greco-Roman curse-texts, notes that a number of texts included in
the corpora of curse-texts have a different atmosphere and phrasing." 14
110. See Charles R. Phillips, The Sociology of Religious Knowledge in the Roman Empire to A.D.
284, 2.16.3 AUFSTIEG UND NIEDERGANG DER ROMISCHEN WELT 2677-2773 (1986); A.F. Segal,
Hellenistic Magic: Some Questions of Definition, in STUDIES IN GNOSTICISM AND HELLENISTIC
RELIGION 349-75 (R. Van Den Broek & M.J. Vermaseren eds., 1981).
111. See Hans G. Kippenberg, Magic in Roman Civil Discourse: Why Rituals Could be Illegal, in
ENVISIONING MAGIC: A PRINCETON SEMINAR AND SYMPOSIUM 137-63, 153-56 (Peter Schifer &
Hans Kippenberg eds., 1997); see also EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE
RELIGIOUS LIFE 43-45 (1965), cited in Dorothy Hammond, Magic: A Problem in Semantics, 72 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1349, 1350 (1970).
112. JAMES FRAZER, I GOLDEN BOUGH 62-78 (1922).
113. Michael Fishbane, Aspects of Jewish Magic in the Ancient Rabbinic Period, in 2
PERSPECTIVES IN JEWISH LEARNING 28, 34 (Nathaniel Stampfer ed., 1979).
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They take the form of a classic legal complaint-and he dubs them
judicial prayer or prayer for justice. Instead of compulsion, there is
aggressive supplication, which he therefore classifies as religious and not
magical-a distinction, he contends, of which the ancients were fully
aware. The crucial difference is that success, the divine response or
judicial decision, is uncertain. It is precisely this uncertainty that deprives
the legal complaint of a genuine magical element because it breaks the
causal connection between the act and the effect in the real world.
This crucial difference also serves to demarcate law from magic
generally. For the lines between the two are sometimes fine. Certainly,
law conceives of itself as an ethical, conceptual, and rational endeavor
devoted to abstractions such as justice, fairness, sovereignty, and interior
mental states of culpability. Magic, by contrast, consists of a body of
principles or rituals of practical importance, with their own internal
standard of rationality, largely governed by precedent, invoked in an
archaic, secret, and cryptic language, and hostile to empirical observation.
But the conceptual rigidity of the law, law's appeal to precedents, to secret
language and to ritual forms, its complex relationship to standards of
rationality other than its own, and its resistance to empirical observation
are still subjects of criticism. Thus, legal theorists such as Axel
Hagerstrom viewed law as a mental or even mystical phenomenon, a
human activity that relies on words as performatives or concrete
exchanges, and understood law's basic assumptions as a form of
secularized magic that relied on magical thinking. Moreover, anyone
familiar with litigation appreciates the persistence of "magic-like" rituals
in law. In-court procedures are so rigidly followed that they can be
reduced to a set of procedural steps that apply to all cases. Only the
lawyers know these steps and forms, the secret language of the law. Legal
procedure is thus a private language, binding together the persons-
lawyers and judges-that use it and excluding all others. Thus, like
magic, law is esoteric and, like magic, it is manipulative, coercive, and for
a fee.
The crucial difference, as with all aggressive prayer, is the factor of
uncertainty. Litigation, like aggressive prayer, is thus an intermediate
category between coercion and supplication. Litigation is aggressive,
imperative, and coercive, but it is also indeterminate and uncertain. The
imagination of jurisdiction is an act of commitment, as Cover understood.
It is a commitment to pursue justice aggressively through legal means
even in the face of uncertainty. The content of the response is in the hands
of the judge, and is always unpredictable. And so, here, too, it is the
fusion of the ancient prophetic roles of the shaman and of the ideal
intercessor pleading for justice that characterizes the secular legal role.
One hopes that, as with the ancient biblical prophets, who Cover so
admired, the shamanistic aspects may be retained but within the overall
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